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ACCOMMODATION OF AN EMPLOYEE'S
RELIGIOUS PRACTICES: TRANS WORLD
AIRLINES, INC. V. HARDISON
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 guarantees an individual
freedom from religious discrimination in employment.' This guaran-
tee generally protects adherents of minority faiths compelled to vio-
late their religious tenets in order to comply with their employment
conditions.2 However, Title VII was also enacted with due regard to
the interests of employers and employees with more conventional re-
ligious practices. The net effect of these competing interests is a
compromise: an employer must reasonably accommodate the reli-
gious practices of his employee unless such accommodation works an
undue hardship on the employer's business.3 In Trans WorldAirlines,
Inc. v. Hardison,4 the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of the em-
ployer's duty to accommodate religious employees, and placed a new
emphasis on the rights of non-religious employees.'
1. Section 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)
(1970), provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer... to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin ....
The notion of religious freedom is a deep seated American tradition. It alone,
perhaps, accounts for the early English and European colonization in the United
States. These early struggles for religious freedom may have provided the impetus
for the special guarantees in the First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof..."
U.S. CONST. amend. I, § I. See generally T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION (1970); P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW (1962).
2. See text accompanying note 21 in ra.
3. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp.
11 1972), discussed at text accompanying notes 22 & 23 infra.
4. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
5. Throughout this Comment, those employees who adhere to more conventional
religious practices are referred to as "non-religious employees." The term merely
designates the class of workers whose religious practices are consistent with, and
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In Hardison, plaintiff employee was discharged by his employer,
TWA, after he failed to report to work on three consecutive Satur-
days.6 The employee was a member of the Worldwide Church of
God, which prohibits followers from working on their Sab-
bath-observed from sundown Friday until sundown Saturday.' The
employee, who lacked sufficient seniority to transfer to a non-Satur-
day job,8 refused to work his assigned Saturday shift. When in-
formed of the employee's problem, TWA considered several possible
accommodations, but rejected them as too burdensome on its opera-
tions.9
Upon his dismissal,'" plaintiff employee filed suit" under Title
therefore do not interfere with, any typical work schedule. The term also designates
workers who adhere to no faith.
6. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 877, 884 (W.D. Mo.
1974). Hardison had been employed as a clerk at TWA's Kansas City, Missouri,
maintenance facility since June 1967. He was discharged in April of 1969. Hardison
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d 33, 35 (8th Cir. 1975).
7. 432 U.S. at 67. The Worldwide Church of God also observes certain annual
"holy days" during which its members do not work. The Church presently includes
over 30,000 baptized members who are heads of households. Brief Amicus Curiae
for Worldwide Church of God at 2, Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S.
63 (1977).
8. TWA and the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
(IAM) [hereinafter referred to as the "union"] maintain a seniority system pursuant to
their collective bargaining agreement. TWA conducts round-the-clock operations
which require that some employees work weekend shifts. As a result, the most senior
employees receive first choice with respect to shift assignments, job transfers and pro-
motions, and vacation period selections. 432 U.S. at 66-67.
In December 1969, Hardison voluntarily transferred from "Building 1" where he
had been working, to "Building 2" to enable him to work a day shift. Since each
Building maintained separate seniority lists, Hardison's transfer caused him to forfeit
his relatively high Building 1 seniority for a low position on the Building 2 seniority
list. Id.
9. TWA refused to allow Hardison to work only four days a week since his job
was considered essential and could not be left vacant on weekends. TWA also re-
fused to fill Hardison's position with an employee from a different department since
that would leave the department undermanned. Finally, TWA would not assign a
regular employee to cover for Hardison on Saturdays since the regular employee
would have to be paid premium wages. Id. at 68-69.
The union refused to waive the seniority system provisions that prevented Hardison
from transferring shifts. Id.
10. Hardison was afforded a hearing before a TWA representative at which he
was found guilty of insubordination. Id. at 69.
11. Prior to initiating this action, Hardison filed an unlawful employment practice
charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC
deferred the charge to the Missouri Commission on Human Rights, which dismissed
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VII' 2 against TWA' 3 and his union.14 The district court found that
TWA could not have reasonably accommodated the plaintiff without
an undue hardship 5 and that the union had fulfilled its statutory
duty,'6 and accordingly entered judgment for the defendants. The
Eighth Circuit affirmed as to the union17 but reversed against TWA,
finding that the employer breached its duty to make a reasonable ac-
commodation to plaintiffs religious needs.' 8
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment against TWA and held
than an employer need not violate a seniority system established pur-
suant to a collective bargaining agreement in order to accommodate
an employee's religious observances.' 9 In addition, the Court held
the complaint as not timely filed, Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d
33, 37 (8th Cir. 1975).
12. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970).
See note I supra.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1970), discussed at note 1 supra.
14. Hardison charged that the union failed to adequately represent him. Hardi-
son v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 877, 881 (W.D. Mo. 1974). 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(c) (1970) provides in part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization-
(1) to ... discriminate against, any individual because of his ... religion...
(2) to ... classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in
any way which would deprive him or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities, or would
limit such employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as
an employee ... because of such individual's... religion ....
15. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 877, 891 (W.D. Mo.
1974). The district court concluded that transferring an employee to work Hardison's
Saturday shift would leave the substitute employee's workcrew short-handed. Alter-
natively, replacing Hardison with an employee not scheduled to work Saturdays
would require TWA to pay premium wages to the substitute. In the court's view,
either accommodation created an "undue burden" on TWA. Id. at 891.
16. Id. at 885, 891.
17. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d 33, 44 (8th Cir. 1975).
18, Id. The Court of Appeals ruled that TWA refused to consider several alter-
native plans that could have reasonably accommodated Hardison without an undue
hardship on the operation of TWA's business. These alternative accommodations in-
cluded offering Hardison a four-day week, filling Hardison's Saturday shift with
other available personnel, and arranging a swap between Hardison and another em-
ployee on Saturdays. Id. at 40-41.
19. 432 U.S. at 79-81. The Court granted petitions for certiorari for both TWA
and the union, despite the union's favorable verdict at the appellate level. 430 U.S.
903 (1976). The Court agreed with the union's contention that the judgment below
against TWA "seriously involve[d]" union interests due to the close relation of the
collective bargaining agreement to the duty imposed on TWA to seek accommodation
for Hardison. However, the Court ruled that the reversal of the judgment against
TWA made a discussion of the union's case unnecessary. 432 U.S. at 70-71 n.5.
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that requiring an employer to bear more than a de minimis cost in
accommodating such an employee is an undue hardship within the
meaning of section 701(j) of Title VII.2 °
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 guarantees equal opportu-
nity in the field of employment. Its purpose is to eliminate employ-
ment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.21 Religious discrimination, however, is subject to particular-
ized treatment under Title VII. Under section 701(j),22 an employer
has a duty to "reasonably accommodate" an employee's or prospec-
tive employee's religious observances unless the employer can
demonstrate that the accommodation would result in an "undue
hardship" on the conduct of his business.23
Concerned that Title VII's sweeping prohibition against employ-
ment discrimination would compel the annulment of employees' se-
niority rights,24 Congress enacted section 703(h) of Title VII,
authorizing disparate treatment of employees pursuant to bona fide
20. 432 U.S. at 84-85. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 2, 42
U.S.C. § 2000ej) (Supp. I 1972).
21. The purpose of [Title VII] is to eliminate, through the utilization of formal
and informal remedial procedures, discrimination in employment based on race,
color, religion, or natural origin.
H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963), reprintedin [1964] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2391, 2401.
22. Congress amended Title VII through the Equal Opportunity Act of 1972,
which added § 7010). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. 111972).
23. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. H 1972). Sec-
tion 701(j) reads in fulil
The term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as
well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably
accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or
practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.
The reasonable accommodation test first appeared in the 1967 guidelines issued by
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b)
(1967), 32 Fed. Reg. 10298 (1967). Section 7010) adopted the EEOC test without any
material changes.
For a discussion of the retroactive effect of§ 7010) on pre-1972 discrimination, see
note 42 infra.
24. Congressional opponents of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 feared Title Vii's
effect on seniority systems. See HOUSE COMM. ON JUDICIARY SUBSTITUTE H.R.
7152 MINORITY REPORT UPON PROPOSED CIvIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1963, 88th Cong.,
2nd Sess., reprintedin [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2431, 2440 ("The provi-
sions of this act grant the power to destroy union seniority "); 110 CONG. REc. 486-88
(1964) (remarks of Sen. Hill) ("Concerted action by the union to enforce its collective
bargaining demands would no longer be protected actively under Federal law.").
But see 110 CONG. REc. 6549 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) ("This bill is not an
instrument to abolish seniority or unions themselves as some have charged "); id. at
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seniority systems. z5 Prior to Hardison, however, it was not clear
whether this preferred status accorded seniority systems affected the
employer's duty to accommodate.26
In addressing this problem, some courts held that employers must
ignore seniority provisions in accommodating a religious employee,
particularly when collective bargaining agreements do not expressly
establish seniority as the sole criterion in making shift assignments.27
Other courts held that employers need not compel senior employees
to substitute for a junior employee who refuses to work shifts that
conflict with his religious observances.2 8 Accordingly, employees'
seniority rights were considered "of the utmost importance, '29 supe-
rior to the religious employee's accommodation right.
The pre-Hardison case law also failed to develop any clear or con-
sistent definition of the employer's duty to accommodate. 30 For ex-
7213 (remarks of Sen. Clark) ("Title VII would have no effect on established seniority
rights "); id. at 1518 (remarks of Rep. Celler); id. at 6564 (remarks of Sen. Kuchel).
25. Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970), the provision reads in pertinent
part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this sub-chapter, it shall not be an un-
lawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of com-
pensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to
a bona fide seniority or merit system ... provided that such differences are not
the results of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or
national origin ....
26. See generally Note, Accommodation of an Employee s Religious Practices under
Title VII, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 867, 884 ("Collective bargaining agreements exacerbate
the difficulties of assessing the hardships of accommodation...").
27. See Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515 (6th Cir.
1975); Shaffield v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Servs., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 937 (M.D.
Ala. 1974).
28. See Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 433 U.S. 915 (1977); Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir.
1970), affdby an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971); Dawson v. Mizell, 325 F.
Supp. 511 (E.D. Va. 1971).
29. Dawson v. Mizell, 325 F. Supp. 511, 514 (E.D. Va. 1971).
30. Accommodation cases usually, although not exclusively, involve Sabbatari-
ans. A number of cases involve Worldwide Church of God members under factual
situations similar to Hardiron. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Mann, 561 F.2d 1282 (8th
Cir. 1977), rev'g Blakely v. Chrysler Corp., 407 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D. Mo. 1975); Wil-
liams v. Southern U. Gas Co., 529 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1976); Draper v. United States
Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1976); Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516
F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), af'dper curiam by an equally divided court, 429 U.S. 65
(1976); Olds v. Tennessee Paper Mills, 15 FEP Cases 472 (6th Cir. 1977); Drum v.
Ware, 7 FEP Cases 269 (W.D. N.C. 1974); Dixon v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 385 F.
Supp. 1382 (D. Neb. 1974); CCH EEOC DEC. (1973) 1 6206.
Seventh Day Adventists incur similar employment problems. See, e.g., United
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ample, the Sixth Circuit, in Cummins v. Parker Seal Co.,31
interpreted the duty to accommodate to mean that no "unreasonable
strain" on a business would be permitted. The court found a Title
VII violation where an employer failed to demonstrate that procuring
a Saturday substitute for a Sabbatarian employee would create an
unreasonable strain on his business." However, a later Sixth Circuit
panel upheld an employer's refusal to hire a Sabbatarian, citing the
"serious morale problems" that would arise if senior employees were
forced to work the applicant's regular Saturday shift. 3 The Supreme
Court twice attempted to review this accommodation standard, but in
each case the Court was equally divided and could only enter per
States v. City of Alburquerque, 545 F.2d 110 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S.
909 (1977); Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975), cerl.
denied, 433 U.S. 915 (1977); Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972);
Burns v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 11 FEP Cases 1441 (D. Ariz. 1976); Jordan v.
North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 399 F. Supp. 172 (W.D. N.C. 1975); Shaffield v. Northrop
Worldwide Aircraft Servs., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 937 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Dawson v.
Mizell, 325 F. Supp. 511 (E.D. Va. 1971); Jackson v. Veri Fresh Poultry, Inc., 304 F.
Supp. 1276 (E.D. La. 1969); CCH EEOC DEC. (1973) 6370; id. 6310.
For decisions involving other Sabbatarians, see Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429
F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), affd by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971) (Sun-
day observer); Kettell v. Johnson & Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. Ark. 1972);
EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) Empl. Prac. Dec. 6500 (1976); CCH EEOC DEC. (1973)
6367; id. 6120 (Other Sabbatarians); CCH EEOC DEC. (1973) 6154 (Orthodox
Jew).
The accommodation standard also arises where certain employment conditions
conflict with an employee's beliefs, such as a religious prohibition against union affili-
ation. See, e.g., Cooper v. General Dynamics, 533 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1976); Yott v.
North Am. Rockwell, 428 F. Supp. 763 (C.D. Cal. 1977). See also Weitkenaut v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 381 F. Supp. 1284 (D. Vt. 1974) (Employee minister
absent to attend church meetings); Marshall v. District of Columbia, 392 F. Supp.
1012 (D.D.C. 1975) (Employee discharged for wearing beard grown in accordance
with religious vow); CCH EEOC DEC. (1973) 6180 (Employee constructively dis-
charged for wearing scarf in accordance with religious tenet); id. 6283 (Black Mus-
lim woman required by faith to wear ankle-length dress).
31. Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), ajf'dper curlam by
an equally divided court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976).
32. Id. at 551.
33. Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512, 517 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 433 U.S. 915 (1977). The Reid panel neither cited nor distinguished its ear-
her opinion in Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), a 'dper
curiam by an equally divided court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976), discussed in text accompanying
notes 31-32 supra.
See also Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 330 (6th Cir. 1970), affdper
curiam by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971) (Court noted the "chaotic
personnel problems" arising if collective bargaining agreement were violated to ac-
commodate religious employee).
[Vol. 15:311
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curiam affirmances.34 As a result, the Supreme Court in Hardison
had an opportunity to clarify two issues: first, could an employer
avoid his duty to accommodate if such accommodation violated an
established seniority system, and second, what is the scope of an em-
ployer's duty to accommodate.
The Court resolved the first issue by holding that the accommoda-
tion duty does not require an employer to violate a senority system in
order to accommodate a religious employee." The Court recognized
that although seniority systems which perpetuate discrimination may
be set aside,36 Title VII does not specifically demand that "an agreed-
upon seniority system must give way when necessary to accommo-
date religious observances." 37 The Court concluded that protection of
a minority religious observer should not come at the expense of se-
nior employees holding a "contractual right" to their own shift pref-
erences.
38
34. See Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), af'd per
curian by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971); Cummins v. Parker Seal Co.,
516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 429 U.S. 65
(1976). An affirmance by an equally divided court is not entitled to precedential
weight. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192 (1972); Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 264
(1960).
35. 432 U.S. at 79.
36. Id. at79n.12. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 778 (1976)
("This Court has long held that employee expectations arising from a seniority system
agreement may be modified by statutes furthering a strong public policy interest").
Franks was a suit brought by black job applicants who showed that an employer had
a racially discriminatory hiring policy. The Court awarded retroactive seniority to
the applicants as part of the "make-whole" objective of § 706(g) of Title VII (42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. 11 1972)).
37. 432 U.S. at 79. For lower court decisions on this issue, see notes 31-33 supra.
38. Id. at 80. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan in dissent, felt other-
wise: "Plainly an employer cannot avoid his duty to accommodate by signing a con-
tract that precludes all reasonable accommodations." Id. at 96. The dissent
suggested that a voluntary replacement be found for Hardison, to be remunerated at
the Saturday overtime rate. Hardison, in turn, volunteered to make himself available
for other overtime periods at the regular rate of pay. Alternatively, TWA could trans-
fer Hardison back to his old position where he held sufficient seniority to avoid Satur-
day work. Although either scheme would violate the collective bargaining
agreement, the dissent believed the violations to be of no consequence to the other
employees, since they were not deprived of any contractual rights. See also Brief
Amicus Curiae of the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs
(COLPA) at 28, where it was argued that a religious employee has a right to be ac-
commodated as an implied right arising from his employment contract. COLPA ar-
gued that the express or implied terms of an individual's contract ensuring
accommodation were entitled to greater weight than a contract between an employer
and the representative of a majority of employees. Id.
1978]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
Moreover, the Court found that disparate treatment of employees
pursuant to bona fide seniority systems is specifically recognized by
Title VII.39 The Court was reluctant to upset a seniority system aris-
ing from a collective bargaining agreement, noting that the seniority
system itself serves as an accommodation mechanism.40 The fact that
the system operates with a discriminatory impact is not sufficient
grounds for invalidation absent a showing of some discriminatory
purpose in its inception.4'
Similarly, the EEOC had previously stated its position that a collective bargaining
agreement must be modified when it results in one of the parties performing an illegal
act. CCH EEOC DEc. (1973) 6367 n.3.
[I]f a collective bargaining agreement is so inflexible as to have the effect of re-
quiring a party to the agreement to discriminate against an individual because of
his religion, and if the inflexibility of the agreement is not justified by substantial
business considerations, then Title VII requires that the agreement be modified
so as to eliminate its discriminatory effect.
Id.
39. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970). See notes
27-29 supra.
40. Id. at 78. The Court noted that TWA's business required Saturday and Sun-
day shifts, "even though most employees preferred those days off." Id. at 80. Al-
though allocating days off in accordance with religious needs would have solved
Hardison's problem, such a method would have come "at the expense of others who
had strong, but perhaps non-religious reasons for not working weekends." Id. at 81.
By contrast, the Court found that a seniority system "represents a neutral way of
minimizing the number of occasions when an employee must work on a day that he
would prefer to have off." Id. at 78.
41. 432 U.S. at 82. Accord, International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324 (1977); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977). In Teamsters,
black job applicants and former employees demanded retroactive seniority from an
employer who was found to have discriminated against blacks and Hispanics through
its hiring, promotion and transfer policies. 431 U.S. at 329-30. The Court granted
retroactive seniority to those applicants who could show instances of discrimination
arising after the adoption of the 1974 Civil Rights Act ("post-Act" applicants). The
Government argued that the seniority system, by perpetuating the effects of racial
discrimination, was not a "bona fide" system within the protection of § 703(h). 431
U.S. at 335. The Court disagreed and refused to extend retroactive seniority to "pre-
Act" discriminatees.
[W]e hold that an otherwise neutral, legitimate seniority system does not become
unlawful under Title VII merely because it perpetuates pre-Act discrimination.
Id. at 353-54. The Court implied that a seniority system would be "not bona fide"
only where "an intent to discriminate entered into its very adoption." Id. at 346,
n.28. See Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 517 (E.D. Va. 1968) ("se-
niority system that has its genesis in racial discrimination is not a bona fide seniority
system").
The plaintiff in Evans, an airline stewardess, was forced to quit by defendant-em-
ployer when she married in 1968. Although plaintiff was rehired in 1972, defendant
refused to credit her pre-1972 seniority. The Court deemed plaintiffs failure to al-
(Vol. 15:311
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The Supreme Court further illuminated the scope of the accommo-
dation duty in holding that an employer is not required to bear more
than "de minimis" costs in accommodating religious employees.42 In
reviewing previous accommodation cases, the Court noted conflicting
holdings from the Fifth,43 Sixth,44 and Tenth45 Circuits and con-
lege any intentional discrimination in the system fatal to her demand for retroactive
seniority. The Evans Court stated:
[Section 703(h)] provides that it shall not be an unlawful employment practice to
apply different terms of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority system,
provided that any disparity is not the result of intentional discrimination. Since
respondent does not attack the bona fides of United's [defendant's] seniority sys-
tem, and since she makes no charge that the system was intentionally designed to
discriminate ... § 703(h) provides a ... ground for rejecting her claim.
431 U.S. at 559-60.
42, 432 U.S. at 84. It should be noted that the alleged discrimination in Hardson
occurred in 1968, prior to the 1972 amendment adding the accommodation standard
to Title VII. EEOC guidelines containing the accommodation standard were, how-
ever, in effect at this time. See note 23 supra. The Court noted, consistent with
General Elec. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), that an EEOC guideline is "not entitled
to great weight." 432 U.S. at 76 n.l I. But cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 433-34 (1971) (administrative interpretation of an act by the enforcing agency is
entitled to great deference).
However, the Court also noted that here, as in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 381-82 (1969), "Congress has not just kept its silence by refusing to
overturn the administrative construction, but has ratified it with positive legislation,"
entitling the guideline to "some deference." 432 U.S. at 76 n.l I. Thus the Court
accepted the guideline as a "defensible construction of the pre-1972 statute," thereby
imposing the duty of reasonable accommodation on TWA, absent a showing of undue
hardship. Id. The Court, however, stopped short of actually applying § 7016) retro-
actively to the facts in Hardison, although it achieved an identical effect by its "defen-
sible construction" analysis.
The retroactivity issue, seemingly avoided here, has caused some concern in the
circuit court cases. See Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113, 1117 (5th Cir. 1972)
("We are satisfied that the guidelines in effect at the time of [employee's] discharge
were valid, as being a proper interpretation of the statute, and as validated by the
subsequent legislative recognition of that fact"). But see Reid v. Memphis Publish-
ing Co., 521 F.2d 512, 520 (6th Cir. 1975) ("The subsequent enactment of [42 U.S.C.]
§ 2000e(j) in 1972 cannot be relied on to establish a Congressional intent with respect
to a 1964 statute which was not expressed in that statute").
43. Compare Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 497 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1974)
with Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972). In Johnson, the court
found that the employer Postal Service "made a good faith effort to reasonably ac-
commodate Johnson's religious observances and practices" and upheld judgment for
the employer. 497 F.2d at 130. The court emphasized that acceding to Johnson's
demands would have worked an undue hardship on the employer's operation, which
required a "flexible employee, available whenever needed." Id. By contrast, in
Riley the employee prevailed after it was conceded that the employer made no at-
tempt at accommodation. 464 F.2d at 1115. These two cases might be distinguished
on the ground that in Johnson some accommodation was offered (employer offered to
recommend religious employee for a transfer to a post office in a larger city or to
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cluded that these decisions provided "little guidance as to the scope
of the employer's obligation."46 Of greater importance to the Court
allow employee "as many Saturdays off as possible," 497 F.2d at 130) while there was
no attempt to accommodate in Riley. However, as the Supreme Court noted, the
Fifth Circuit did not expressly suggest any "theory of decision to justify the differing
results." 431 U.S. at 75 n.10.
See also Young v. Southwestern Say. & Loan, 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975) (atheist
employee objected to opening prayer at company meetings, held employee was con-
structively discharged in circumstances which amounted to religious discrimination);
Cooper v. General Dynamics, 533 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1976) (Seventh Day Adventist
employee refused to pay union dues on religious grounds, held for employee).
44. Compare Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 433 U.S. 915 (1977) with Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir.
1975), affidper curlam by an equally divided court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976) and Draper v.
United States Pipe and Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1976). The Reid court
cited "serious morale problems" that would arise if senior employees were assigned to
substitute on Saturdays for Reid, a Seventh Day Adventist applying for the job of
copyreader at defendant's newspaper. 521 F.2d at 520. The Court, turning to Web-
ster's New International Dictionary for guidance as to the meaning of "undue hard-
ship," also noted the potential cost of paying overtime to Reid's substitute and held
that the employer need not "suffer a hardship" in order to accommodate Reid. 521
F.2d at 517, 521. The Reid panel neither cited nor distinguished its earlier opinion in
in Cummins, involving a religious employee who was discharged "after complaints
arose from fellow [employees] who were forced to substitute for him on Saturdays."
416 F.2d at 545. The court, deciding that "undue hardship is something greater than
hardship" held that the employer failed to demonstrate that accommodating Cum-
mins would have imposed "an unreasonable strain" on the employer's business. 516
F.2d at 551. Accord, Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 520
(6th Cir. 1976). See also Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 335 (6th Cir.
1970), a.f'd by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971) ("IT]he employer ought
not be forced to accommodate each of the varying religious beliefs and practices of
his employees").
45. Williams v. Southern U. Gas Co., 529 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1976). The court
stated: "The phrases 'reasonably accommodate' and 'undue hardship' are relative
terms and cannot be given any hard and fast meaning." Id. at 488. Plaintiff Wil-
liams was a Sabbatarian discharged after refusing to work one Saturday during an
"emergency." Id. at 484. The court emphasized that the employer, a public utility,
had a duty to provide uninterrupted service to the consuming public as well as a duty
to "adhere to employment practices that were fair to its other employees." Id. at 488.
Weighing these duties against the employer's Title VII duty to accommodate Wil-
liams, the court found the employer acted reasonably under the circumstances, al-
though the court conceded the matter was one in which "reasonable minds might
conceivably differ." Id. Cf. United States v. City of Albuquerque, 545 F.2d 110, 114
(10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 909 (1977) (member of Worldwide Church of
God discharged as firefighter for not working Saturdays as scheduled, held accommo-
dating employee would work an undue hardship on the "business" of "fire suppres-
sion").
46. 432 U.S. at 75 n.10. Similarly the Court found that EEOC guidelines were of
little aid.
mhe employer's statutory obligation to make reasonable accommodation for the
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was the evidence of increased costs that TWA would incur in accom-
modating the plaintiff employee.47 In the Court's view, an employer
should not undertake more than de minimis expenditures in accom-
modating an employee's religious practices.48 The Court opposed
forcing an employer to make significant expenditures on behalf of a
religious employee without affording similar treatment to non-reli-
gious employees.4 9
The holding in TWA Y. Hardison illustrates several themes fre-
quently associated with the Burger Court. First, the holding is con-
sistent with prior decisions in which discriminatory intent must be
shown before a seniority system will be set aside.5" Absent a "clear
and express indication from Congress,"'" the Court is reluctant to
religious observances of its employees, short of incurring an undue hardship is
clear, but the reach of that obligation has never been spelled out by Congress or
by Commission guidelines.
Id. at 75. Earlier the Court had traced the accommodation standard's genesis in
EEOC guidelines, but noted "the Commission did not suggest what sort of accommo-
dations are 'reasonable' or when hardship to an employer becomes 'undue."' fd. at
72.
47. The Court rejected the Eighth Circuit's suggestions that Hardison's Saturday
shift could have been filled by supervisory personnel or by regular employees at
higher wages. Either alternative, in the Court's view, would have involved costs to
TWA through lost efficiency or higher wage expenditures. Id. at 84.
48. Id. at 84. The Court stated: "To require TWA to bear more than de minimis
costs in order to give Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hardship." Id.
49. -[T]o require TWA to bear additional costs when no such costs are incurred to
give other [non-religious] employees the days off that they want would involve une-
qual treatment of employees on the basis of their religion." Id.
50. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977);
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977), discussed at note 41 supra.
Hardison alleged no such discriminatory purpose: "It was coincidental that in plain-
tiffs case the seniority system acted to compound his problems in exercising his relig-
ion." 432 U.S. at 82, quoting district court opinion, 375 F. Supp. at 883.
The trend may also be seen in some of the Court's equal protection cases involving
alleged racial discrimination. Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,431
(1971) (Civil Rights Act of 1964 proscribes practices fair in form but discriminatory in
effect) with Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (unconstitutionality is de-
pendent upon a showing of a racially discriminatory purpose). The Davis Court
expressly excepted the case from the stricter standards of Title VII as construed by
Griggs, over the dissent of Justices Brennan and Marshall. See also Village of Ar-
lington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Co., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (zoning chal-
lenge, held plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of proving a "discriminatory
purpose" as a "motivating factor" in the zoning regulations); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 431 U.S. 902 (1977) (court-ordered busing, held finding of dispro-
portionate racial percentages in schools not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
absent a showing of "intentionally segregative actions").
51. 432 U.S. at 79.
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place the onus of discrimination on an employer who has failed to
accommodate a minority employee's religious practices.5 2 Conse-
quently the reasonable accommodation standard, promulgated with-
out a clear indication of its practical effect, is interpreted narrowly by
the Court.
Similarly, the Burger Court's reading of the accommodation duty
as imposing no greater than "de minimis cost"53 on an employer is
consistent with its refusal to interpret Title VII as requiring an em-
ployer to grant special privileges to religious employees.5 4 An em-
ployer who undertakes significant costs in accommodating his
minority employees would be extending "unequal treatment to his
employees on the basis of their religion,' '5 5 resulting in a type of re-
verse discrimination against the non-religious majority of employ-
ees.56 By requiring only de minimis accommodation expenditures,
52. Cf. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), afd by an
equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971). "The fundamental error of [employee]
and the Amii Curiae is that they equate religious discrimination with failure to ac-
commodate. We submit these two concepts are entirely different. The employer
ought not to be forced to accommodate each of the varying religious beliefs and prac-
tices of his employees." 429 F.2d at 335.
53. The dissent strenuously objected to this interpretation: "As a matter of law, I
seriously question whether simple English usage permits 'undue hardship' to be inter-
preted to mean 'more than a de minimis cost'....... Id. at 93 n.6 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Additionally, the dissent felt that TWA had not proven that accommodat-
ing Hardison would have saddled it with more than de minimis cost. Id.
54. Id. at 84-85.
The Court theorized that TWA might allocate days off in accordance with employ-
ees' religious needs. Such an alternative was rejected, however, since it would have
come "at the expense of others who had strong, but perhaps non-religious reasons for
not working on weekends." Id. at 81. The court refused to construe the accommoda-
tion statute "to require an employer to discriminate against some employees in order
to enable others to observe their Sabbath." Id. at 85.
In contrast, the dissenting opinion interpreted the Civil Rights Act as requiring
employers to "grant privileges to religious observers as part of the accommodation
process." Id. at 91.
55. Id. at 84.
56. Accommodation of a minority religious observer should not come at the ex-
pense of the non-religious majority of employees. See note 54 supra. An employer,
in the Court's view, need not afford preferential treatment to minorities if discrimina-
tion against the non-religious majority results. In short, "Title VII does not contem-
plate such unequal treatment." Id. at 80.
The dissent would have allowed such "unequal treatment" in favor of the religious
employee. Id. at 87 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall argued that rejecting
an accommodation simply because it includes preferential treatment of a minority
employee would mean that § 701(j) of Title VII, while brimming with "sound and
fury," ultimately "signiflies] nothing." Id.
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the Hardison Court not only eased the employer's burden but also
protected these majority interests.57
Although Hardison clarifies the impact of the accommodation
standard on seniority systems, the Court's novel use of a de minimis
cost test leaves the standard unsettled. The Court clearly holds that
TWA was not obligated to order a shift-swap or pay a substitute em-
ployee premium wages in accommodating Hardison.5" What is not
clear is whether these accommodations were rejected because they
would violate the seniority system or because they would have sad-
dled TWA with greater than de minimis cost.59
57. Additionally it might be argued that the Court, by reading a "not more than
de minimis cost" test into the accommodation standard, tacitly avoided a possible first
amendment Establishment Clause challenge: requiring an employer to bear no more
than a de minimis cost of accommodation is not the sort of "excessive government
entanglement" that will invalidate a statute under the first amendment. See Com-
mittee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). The Court never addressed the first amendment issue di-
rectly, merely citing in a footnote the district court's concern that accommodation of
religious employees might impose a "priority of the religious over the secular," in
violation of the Establishment Clause. 432 U.S. at 69-70 n.4. See Edwards &
Kaplan, Religious Discrimination and the Role ofArbitration under Title VII, 69 MICH.
L. REV. 599, 628 (1971). Since the Supreme Court found no Title VII violation here,
it refused to rule on the constitutionality of the accommodation duty. The Court will
not reach a constitutional issue if a case may be decided on non-constitutional
grounds. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
However, the first amendment challenge was a major concern of both parties. See
Brief for Appellant at 21-46; Brief for Respondent at 23-39. No less than nine amicus
briefs were filed addressing the constitutional issue. The dissent concluded that the
accommodation duty was beyond constitutional challenge, citing analogous cases in
which the exemption of religious observers from state-imposed duties withstood first
amendment attacks. 432 U.S. at 91. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
The lower courts have frequently confronted this question. A federal district court
in California declared 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) unconstitutional. Yott v. North Am.
Rockwell Corp., 428 F. Supp. 763 (C.D. Cal. 1977). Accord, Cummins v. Parker Seal
Co., 516 F.2d 544, 554 (6th Cir. 1975) (dissenting opinion). See also Edwards &
Kaplan, Religious Discrimination and the Role ofArbitration under Title VI11, 69 MICH.
L. REv. 599,628(1971). Note, Is Title VIIs Reasonable Accommodation Requirement
a Law "Respecting an Establishment of Religion?" 51 NOTRE DAME LAw. 481, 485
(1976).
The Hardison district court expressly found the statute not in violation of the first
amendment. 375 F. Supp. at 887. Accord, Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d
544, 552 (6th Cir. 1975); Jordan v. North Carolina Nat'l. Bank, 399 F. Supp. 172, 180
(W.D.N.C. 1975); Ward v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 397 F. Supp. 375, 377
(W.D. Pa. 1975); Comment, Religious Observance and Discrimination in Employment,
22 SYR. L. REv. 1019, 1027 (1971). See also Lopatka, A 1977 Primer on the Federal
Regulation of Employment Discrimination, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 69, 103.
58. 432 U.S. at 84.
59. Arguably the holding might be limited by its factual situation-a 24-hour, 7-
day operation requiring weekend employees. However, a recent Eighth Circuit case
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TW v. Hardison in effect allows an employer two "outs" from his
duty to accommodate an employee's religious practices. He might
show accommodation would violate his collective bargaining agree-
ment.6" Alternatively (or, preferably, in addition) he could prove ac-
commodation would force him to bear greater than de minimis costs.
The combination of these two avenues of escape leaves an employer
with less of a burden than the "reasonable-accommodation-unless-
undue-hardship" test6 ' seems to require.62 Hopefully an employer
who makes no attempt at accommodating his employee's religious
needs is still in violation of Title VII.63
The accommodation standard is significantly weakened by the
Hardison court's narrow interpretation. The employer's duty is now
lessened, "undue hardship" is construed as "not greater than de mini-
mus costs," and the "rights" of non-religious employees arising from
their collective bargaining agreements are secured. Although Title
VII and its reasonable accommodation standard are aimed at elimi-
nating discrimination in employment, the Hardison decision neither
furthers this goal nor advances America's long tradition of religious
pluralism. Instead, it forces members of minority faiths increasingly
to choose between their religion or their job."
Michael Wise
indicates Hardson retains some broader ramifications. See Huston v. UAW Local
93, 559 F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1977) (court in Huston, noting Hardison's temporary shift
transfer was deemed an undue hardship on his employer, held that employer and
union may refuse to approve religious employee's permanent shift change if such
transfer violates seniority provisions).
60. Two post-Hardison decisions have affirmed the primacy of a collective bar-
gaining agreement over the accommodation of religious employees. See Huston v.
UAW Local 93, 559 F.2d 477, 480 (8th Cir. 1977); Chrysler Corp. v. Mann, 561 F.2d
1282, 1285 (8th Cir. 1977), revg Blakely v. Chrysler Corp., 407 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D.
Mo. 1975).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000eoj) (Supp. 11 1972). See note 23 supra.
62. See notes 53 and 56 supra (comments of Justice Marshall).
63. For cases where employers who made no attempt at accommodation were
held guilty of employment discrimination, see Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113
(5th Cir. 1972); Shaffield v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Services, Inc., 373 F. Supp.
937 (M.D. Ala. 1974). Chrysler Corp. v. Mann, 561 F.2d 1282 (8th Cir. 1977), rev'g
Blakely v. Chrysler Corp., 407 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D. Mo. 1975) (court suggested that
an employee is under a duty to "attempt to accommodate his religious beliefs him-
self'). See also Note, Title VIIAn Employer's View of Religious Discrimination Since
the 1972 Amendment, 7 Loy. CHi. L.J. 97, 107 (1976) ("Failure to make any effort
will virtually ensure a finding that the employer committed an unlawful employment
practice").
64. See 432 U.S. at 87 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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